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0xL4ugh CTF v5 — Stockpile Breach (DFIR & Sliver C2 Investigation)

0xL4ugh CTF v5: Stockpile Breach DFIR Writeup#

Executive Summary#

This Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) investigation examined a compromised workstation belonging to Khaled Allam, an employee in the Finance department at EZ-CERT. The attack chain began with a social engineering-themed download and concluded with the establishment of a persistent Command and Control (C2) channel using the Sliver framework.

CAUTION

This incident demonstrates a classic “Trojanized Application” attack vector targeting finance employees with fake stock monitoring software.


Incident Timeline#

Timestamp (UTC)Event
2025-02-07 04:37:06Malware downloaded from app.finance.com
2025-02-07 04:41:24Malware executed by user
2025-02-07 04:41:24C2 connection established to 3.121.219.28:8888
2025-02-07 04:41:35Initial reconnaissance (whoami)
2025-02-07 04:43:51Malware copied to C:\Windows\Temp\
2025-02-07 04:45:03Registry persistence established

Phase 1: Initial Access and Execution#

Attack Vector Analysis#

The victim downloaded a malicious application masquerading as a legitimate stock monitoring utility from a social engineering domain.

AttributeValue
Source Domainapp.finance.com
Malicious FilemonitorStock.exe
Download Timestamp2025-02-07 04:37:06 UTC
Download LocationC:\Users\khaled.allam\Downloads\

File Creation Evidence (Sysmon Event ID 11)#

SystemTime: 2025-02-07 04:37:26.366516+00:00
Image: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe
TargetFilename: C:\Users\khaled.allam\Downloads\monitorStock.exe

Zone.Identifier (Mark of the Web)#

[ZoneTransfer]
ZoneId=3
ReferrerUrl=http://app.finance.com/
HostUrl=http://app.finance.com/monitorStock.exe

Malware Indicators#

Hash TypeValue
SHA256314AA91A2AD7770F67BF43897996A54042E35B6373AE5D6FEB81E03A077255A7
MD5A95672C643FB8521FAB9B7CAE1366F7E
IMPHASHF0EA7B7844BBC5BFA9BB32EFDCEA957C

Phase 2: Command and Control (C2)#

Upon execution, the malware immediately established a connection to an external Sliver C2 server.

AttributeValue
C2 Server IP3.121.219.28
C2 Port8888
C2 Hostnameapp.finance.com
FrameworkSliver

Network Connection Evidence (Sysmon Event ID 3)#

<Event>
<EventData>
<Data Name="Image">C:\Users\khaled.allam\Downloads\monitorStock.exe</Data>
<Data Name="DestinationIp">3.121.219.28</Data>
<Data Name="DestinationPort">8888</Data>
<Data Name="DestinationHostname">app.finance.com</Data>
</EventData>
</Event>

Phase 3: Persistence and Defense Evasion#

Registry Persistence (MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001)#

The attacker established persistence via the Windows “Run” key:

Terminal window
reg.exe add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v FilePersistence /t REG_SZ /d C:\Windows\Temp\monitorStock.exe /f

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping#

TacticTechniqueID
Initial AccessPhishingT1566
ExecutionUser ExecutionT1204.002
PersistenceBoot/Logon AutostartT1547.001
Defense EvasionMasqueradingT1036
DiscoverySystem Owner DiscoveryT1033
Command and ControlApplication Layer ProtocolT1071

Complete IOC Table#

ArtifactValue
Malware NamemonitorStock.exe
SHA256314AA91A...077255A7
C2 FrameworkSliver
C2 Address3.121.219.28:8888
C2 Domainapp.finance.com
Persistence KeyHKCU\...\Run\FilePersistence
Victim UserEZ-CERT\khaled.allam

Flag: 0xL4ugh{1t_w4s_just_@_warmup_488f13f8bf}